Mohammad Reza Mohammadi  
Mediapolis High School  
Mediapolis, IA  
Afghanistan, Factor 18  

**Promoting Afghan’s lives by bringing a democratic government based on people’s power, placing honest and professional staff, and efficient policies**

Afghanistan is a country of 28 million people with diverse ethnic groups including Pashtuns (42%), Tajik (27%), Hazara (9%), and Uzbek (9%). There are additional ethnic groups that make up this continuing growing country. Even though there is diversity in ethnic group we see one primary religion of Islam. Muslims make 99% of the religion groups with Sunni being 80% and Shia being 19%. Afghanistan is a mountainous country, more than 49 percent of the total land area lies above 2,000 meters in elevation.

The typical family in Afghanistan has 7 members. That the family is mostly supported by one person’s wages. The formal education sector is slowly improving, but progress is hampered by a shortage of qualified teachers, poor facilities and threats posed by insurgents. Even so, over two thirds of school-age children attend school. Girls, banned from school under the Taliban regime, are gradually retuning to the classroom, but 70 percent are not still enrolled. Adult literacy rates still remain low, at 43 percent for men and 14 percent for women. Afghanistan’s educational system is following the way they used to follow 15 years ago. No updates have been observed to books. In each class some 60 students are attending that decreases the teacher’s ability with limited support of government to teach students and enhance the level of education by labs. Everything goes by theory. Students can’t have scientific experiments due to less government’s budget specialized for schools. This issue cause’s student to lose interest in school since they are not allowed to utilize hands-on learning experiments such as labs.

Government and private hospitals are available in Afghanistan. Life expectancy has increased slightly to 44.5 years for men and 44 years for women, many of the country’s health indicators are alarming; Along with a high infant mortality rate. Afghanistan suffers from one of the highest levels of maternal mortality in the world at 1,600 deaths per 100,000 live births. More than half of children under the age of five are malnourished and have micronutrient deficiencies; particularly iodine and iron are widespread. Afghanistan faces enormous recovery needs after three decades of war, civil unrest and recurring natural disasters. Despite, recent progress, millions of Afghans still live in severe poverty with a crumbling infrastructure and a landscape that is suffering from environmental damage, this rugged land locked country, remains one of the poorest in the world, with half of the population living below the poverty line. An estimated 85 percent of Afghans are dependent on agriculture and related agribusiness for their livelihoods. The excellent reputation of Afghanistan’s almonds, pomegranate, pistachios, grapes, and apricots, among other crops, is still widely recognized and offers the best hope for rebuilding and expanding licit agriculture. Afghanistan’s opium production in 2009 was higher than 300,000 tons. While poppy production and the opium trade have a significant monetary share of the country’s agricultural economy, both this share and the number of farmers growing opium continue to decline. Farmers are taking advantage of opportunities to produce and market alternatives to opium. The size of a farm in Afghanistan is 1,000 meter square. Agriculture in Afghanistan is based on human force. Clearly, Afghans use cows or donkeys to plow, water by making alleys by shovels, use limited amount of chemical fertilizers, and cultivate by hand. This makes it very hard for farmers to go ahead with their job and feed the 50% of Afghans living under poverty involved with serious hunger. Moreover, huge population growth has caused many disabilities for the corrupted government based on power of an ethnic group has made it more difficult for Afghans. Licit commercial agriculture is playing a significant role in increasing the income of rural populations, who now recognize that the opium trade is destabilizing, contributes to
insecurity and the insurgency, and undermines rule of law. Opium can be counted as a supporter of the antigovernment group Taliban which is making it, a big monster of terrorism and insecurity not only to Afghanistan but also to the world. This has resulted preventing investments in agricultural and industrial production by foreign and internal investors.

The job field has been harmed by these consequences. According to the new survey the average income of a typical Afghan is predicted to be $1,000 per year. In Afghanistan the demands for a job is high which causes the low salary. 50% of your wages go for food. While 12% goes for transportation, the other 38% is spent for health, education and traditional expenses. Afghans immigrate to Iran, Pakistan and European countries because of lake of life facilities; they involve a lot of dangers in illegal way to Iran; however, they count the possibility to be killed in the border of Iran. They accept all dangers and leave their families to support them financially.

The 2007-2008 national risk and vulnerability assessment found that 7.4 million people-nearly a third of the population- are unable to get enough food to live active, healthy lives. Another 8.5 million people, or 37 percent, are on the borderline of food insecurity. Around 400,000 people each year are seriously affected by natural disasters, such as droughts, foods, earthquakes or extreme weather conditions.

In 2007, after Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, Afghanistan was hit by both drought and globally high food prices; with this, saw the price of wheat and wheat product increase dramatically across the country. Despite prices beginning to reduce in 2009, they remain higher than normal. Afghans have repeatedly, identified “poverty and unemployment as the driving forces behind insecurity” and called for these issues to be addressed as a priority. According to a recent Oxfam study, “seventy percent of Afghan surveyed see poverty and unemployment as the major cause of the conflict in their country.” Some people participate in insurgent activities to acquire an income. Joining anti government elements or undertaking other illegal activities. Such as drug production and trafficking, is often more lucrative and with immediate returns, than struggling with farming or working in the informal sector for low wages. For example, some Kuchi Youth in the south-eastern province of Khost, reported to field researches that planting road minds, bring in between Pak Rs.1000 and 50000 (about USD 16 to 80), while a fortunate daily labor earns a maximum of USD 4 a day. Revenge and rivalry are amongst other factors explaining the interest of some who participate directly in the armed conflict. Abuse of power is a key driver of poverty vested interests frequently shape the public agenda, whether in relation to the law, policy, or the allocation of resources. This report argues that the government is often unable to deliver basic services, such as security, food, or shelter. Widespread corruption further limits access to services for a large proportion of the population. In addition, many Afghans perceive international actors as primarily interred in short-term objectives rather than changing entrenched and abusive power structures.

Following the Tokyo conference on reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan in January 2002, a mission composed of representatives of external funding agencies, led by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and visited Afghanistan for on one week during February 2002 to initiate a needs assessment for the natural resources and agriculture sector. This mission provided the foundation for, and recommended a more detailed analysis of needs by, the current mission, which visited Afghanistan from 7 April to 7 May 2002. The CNA mission, was led by ADB and comprised many organizations.

In 1978, Afghanistan’s population of 14 million was self-sufficient in cereals and had a flourishing export market in horticultural products. The present population is estimated at about 28 million, with a rural population of around 16.5 million. In the past 20 or so years, enabling agricultural systems to more than keep pace with population increases. On this basis, and assuming a stable, democratic and secure political environment, it would be realistic to expect Afghanistan’s return to its 1978 status in the not too distant future. The process of recovery has started, but require further elaboration to ensure that all concerned are
contributing constructively to this common goal recovery of the rural sector will depend upon balancing sustainable natural resource and population pressures. As the economy remains overwhelmingly rural and agricultural 80-85% of Afghans depend upon natural resources for their livelihood-the pace of recovery in the rural sector will largely determine the overall rate of economic recovery. Rural society is structured into numerous settlements (more than 30,000 clustered into about18000 communities). Many of whose access to external assistance and markets is very limited or costly. Although the country’s different areas exhibit marked geographical differences in their capacity to generate wealth, village society shows a distinctive cross-section that is irrespective of location or agro-ecological zone.

Number of the programs that improve agricultural production, agribusiness development, watershed and irrigation improvement, and governance capacity to provide services and a business enabling environment for private sector. The two broad goals of new USG agricultural strategy for Afghanistan, not only, increase for and sales by Afghan farmers, herders and businesses and to the Afghan people in government.

Prior successes in the field of alternative development have helped to increase the number of poppy free provinces to 20 in 2009. Maintaining and building on these success requires broadening USAID’s work to reach farmers, agribusiness, and government service providers across Afghanistan. The government must provide materials technology, and expertise necessary to produce, process, and market high value crops; in addition, improving watershed management and irrigation, farm-to-market roads, and marketplace infrastructure. Community development program matrix can comprise: communities empowered to undertake ownership and management policy formulation; precise role of empowered community representatives(shuras) in project design and implementation defined; in service training programs; public sector role in empowered community development programs; human resources development policies; a law is needed prescribing the rights, roles, and functions of community organizations within the context of the community-based approach; and a highly qualified, motivated public service.

The people of Afghanistan must own and implement the development agenda, within a common strategic framework; the private sector should be the principal instrument of economic growth, within an appropriate enabling policy framework; all sections of the rural population should participate in decision making, and a community based approach should promote this participation; investment in human capital and maximum use of Afghan expertise is essential to the recovery process; and investment decisions by external funding agencies must sit firmly within the sector framework and related budgetary norms. Determinants of a strategic approach are a number of factors, both conventional and specific to current circumstances, are relevant to the formulation of a medium term development framework. The conventional factors include: the demand for the sectors products, both domestic; the spatial distributions and quality of resources endowments; population distributions and the unit size of population groups and; the accessibility of population units to markets and sources of raw materials. These are the factors that largely determining the geographical allocation and; use of both natural and human resources and the need for differentiated development responses depending upon the precise combination of factors in a particular location. Human rights are required to live in dignity and security; these include civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. All these rights must be enjoyed equally and without discrimination. In the human rights based approach to development, process is important in order to achieve desired outcomes; Underlying inequalities and discrimination which inhibit the development of the poorest as well as marginalized groups and those who are vulnerable to discrimination. The main elements of these can be participation of people in monitoring development, accountability, on-discrimination and attention to groups which are marginalized or vulnerable to discrimination, transparency and empowerment. A People should participate in the planning, designing, monitoring, and evaluation of decisions concerning their development. In Afghanistan, the more specific factors include the impact of returning refugees, food security following three years of drought, poppy substitution and mined areas. Each of these specific
factors calls for additional efforts in particular locations during the short to medium term. The result of combining all these factors is a complex and diverse geographical pattern of development need, which will require a combination of support by external funding agencies, private investment, and the transfer of appropriate technologies, reshaped institutions, enhanced human resources, and the best efforts of the Afghan people.

The practical dilemma in implementing the new strategy is that food and agriculture problems cannot be separated from problems caused by conflict, corruption, and narcotics trafficking, moreover, winning the war requires efforts that can have a sustained effect on a scale large enough to win the support of both farmers and the general population—much of which now is either “urbanized” settled in populated areas without direct ties to agriculture, or settled in areas where they may provide some seasonal farm labor but are not landowners or employed as farmers long enough to live without series malnutrition. The UN report notes that “the rural population, which account for 47 percent cents of Afghans, faces particular challenges. It is estimated that the portion of poor households among those that own land is 26 per cent, while amongst those that rent, sharecrop or have a montage on their land the portion if 42 per cent.”

Classical agricultural aid may or may not solve any of these problems at the scale required for a successful population-centric strategy. Many Afghans “farmers” do not have enough land on a per capita basis to feed their families—much less earn a living. Aid that benefits individual farmers may or may not have enough scale of effect really improve this situation. It may have little or no impact on poverty relief and food security in Afghanistan, as GIROA corruption and insurgent extortion can affect every aspect of both agriculture and food distribution.

Where agricultural aid programs do reach part of the population, they may not have the desired result. Aid may benefit some farmers at the expenses of most of the local population, much of the money may be lost to power brokers or insurgent extortion, and pressure from narcotics trafficker and insurgent may limit or cripple the impact of such programs.

In conclusion, Afghanistan’s insecurity has caused poverty and hunger. That can be solved by a stable and democratic government.
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